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Abstract 
Groundwater is one of the most vital of all common pool resources throughout the world. 
More than half of groundwater is used to grow crops. This research models groundwater 
depletion patterns within a multi-agent system framework. Irrigators are modeled as agents 
in the multi-agent system.  
 
The irrigation strategies adopted by the agents are investigated using game theory, under 
several futuristic scenarios. The consequence of unregulated groundwater extraction in each 
case is analyzed. A set of five irrigators, growing three crops: corn, sorghum and wheat, have 
been considered in this study. To allow groundwater flow, these agents are assumed to be 
located in adjoining farm lands. Irrigators are modeled selfish agents that strategize their 
irrigation patterns in order to maximize their own utilities, i.e. the difference between the 
total revenue obtained from crop sales and the costs incurred, including groundwater 
extraction costs. Due to groundwater flow, irrigators have no incentive to conserve 
groundwater for later use. This leads to unsustainable depletion of the resource. Using the 
Nikaido-Isoda relaxation algorithm, their irrigation strategies under Nash equilibrium, when 
no irrigator can increase its utility by unilaterally changing its strategy, are obtained. 
 
All parameters in this research are representative of Kansas. Recorded environmental and 
economic data of the region, along with the DSSAT software, have been used to obtain these 
futuristic projections. These scenarios include temperature increase, lowering of the water 
table, different precipitation levels, and different price increases for the crops.  One of the 
emergent phenomena of the simulations is the adoption of crop rotation patterns by the 
irrigators to conserve groundwater. The irrigators grow corn, which is a more profitable yet 
water intensive crop in one year, and in the next, conserve water by growing sorghum 
instead. Another emergent outcome of this research is the viability of LEMAs. When the 
irrigators are subject to LEMA-level limits on groundwater use, there is a slight increase in 
the aggregate utility of the LEMA. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 1.1 Background 
Groundwater is one of the most vital of all natural resources throughout the world that is 
currently being consumed at unsustainable levels throughout the globe [WB+10, SC+12]. 
Groundwater depletion threatens to be a major worldwide problem with severe social, 
economic and ecological consequences, including the drying up of wells, increased pumping 
costs, deteriorated water quality, and land subsidence. The long-term effects of water 
scarcity include famine, the outbreak of disease, and socio-economic and political conflict. 
Within the US, over half of the population relies on groundwater for drinking and other 
domestic use. Additionally, groundwater constitutes about 67% of all water used for 
irrigation [Bar14, MK+14].  
 
The high rate of depletion of groundwater has been attributed to the observation that due to 
the tendency of the water to flow from one geographic location to another, there is little 
incentive for individual irrigators to conserve water. Hence their rational strategy is to 
overexploit the resource, leading to the situation commonly referred to as the tragedy of the 
commons [Har68, GS80]. Fortunately, more recent studies indicate that the coordinated use 
of groundwater can be very effective in addressing sustainability issues [Og93]. Recent 
studies on groundwater usage that take into account spatial hydrologic elements suggest 
that the coordinated use of groundwater can be very effective in limiting its depletion 
[BSZ10]. 
 
The Ogallala aquifer is one of the most extensive bodies of water in the US, covering 
approximately 450,000 km2 across South Dakota, Wyoming, Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, New Mexico and Texas [Lit09, Bar14, BKH14, MK+14, USG14, USG15], providing 
30% of all groundwater extracted in the US and 82% of the drinking water demands of the 
region’s 2.3 million strong population. An estimated $35 billion worth of crop yield each year 
relies directly on groundwater extracted from it [USG15]. 
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Figure 1.1. The Ogallala aquifer (blue) in the Great Plains region of the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kansas’ water users divert about 1.6–1.9 trillion gallons water for uses such as irrigation, 
power generation, public water supplies, industrial processes, stock-watering and other 
purposes, with the Ogallala aquifer being the primary source. About 85% of this water is 
used for irrigation [KWO93, MCG09, MG11, KDA13, KGS13]. Unfortunately, large-scale 
irrigation of the Ogallala aquifer, driven by technological innovations as well as increased 
demands of corn production for bio-fuels, has raised groundwater extraction to 
unsustainable levels [Wan11].  
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Future extrapolations of climate change, precipitation, and water needs present a bleak 
scenario for the Ogallala aquifer [HP11, Wan11, SB+13, BKH14]. A recent study projects that 
current extraction levels would result in groundwater depletion of 39% within the next 50 
years [SB+13]. This could be further exacerbated based on recently published projections of 
the Central Plains region [CAS15]. Recharge supplies 15% of the current pumping level. At 
this rate, it would take an estimated 500–1,300 years to completely refill it. 
 
 1.2 Literature Survey 
A significant amount of research on modeling approaches of natural resource sustainability, 
including groundwater is available in the existing literature [Fis12]. In order to address the 
conflicting goals of stakeholders in maximizing economic gains through groundwater 
extraction and eliciting sustainable consumption, several such studies have applied a multi-
objective approach. One such study takes into account the objectives of water users, 
stakeholders, and a governmental agency (EPA) [KFB+10].  Six different water management 
policies are evaluated using different multi-criteria metrics and found to produce similar 
results [HH08]. Elsewhere, multi-objective evolutionary algorithms are applied to evolve 
optimal groundwater extraction policies [STL+09]. Another study, which also considers 
sustainable water use as an objective, models groundwater extraction in semi-arid 
conditions [GSS12]. Although multi-objective approaches offer the means to look into the 
tradeoff between economically profitable groundwater depletion and its sustainable 
depletion, they do not address how sustainability can be furthered without reducing 
immediate economic gains. 
 
Several game theoretic models of groundwater use, with agents representing either 
individual users or user clusters, have been proposed recently [KBF+10, HKW11, Zuc11, 
LPE13, Hai14, Dol15, OY15]. Several studies are limited to two-agent static games [GS80, 
Mad10, CPME12, GPK+13, Hai14]. Other studies that aim to capture the behavior of a larger 
number of agents either apply principles of evolutionary game theory [NWV07, MKA12] or 
use other means to simplify the underlying model, such as structurally simple spatial agent 
configurations [SGB11]. Although analytical models are attractive from the standpoint of 
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mathematical tractability, they rely on several simplifications and consequently, do not 
consider details such as spatial heterogeneity of the groundwater resource, annual trends in 
weather patterns, as well as various miscellaneous nonlinearities present in the real world. 
It has been argued that such assumptions are not adequate to capture more detailed aspects 
of groundwater depletion [ASS+12].  
 
More computationally intensive approaches have been employed in large-scale models of 
common pool resource use [Bou05, CAT10, HBR10, NLRY14, AN14], including that of 
groundwater [BBM+07, LE10, OKH+10, CPME12, OKH12, MBY14]. These models are more 
effective in incorporating finer geophysical and economic details of the real world [An12]. 
Various aspects of groundwater use have been explored using multiple agent based 
computer simulations, such as water rights trading [BBM+07], water distribution policies 
[OKH12, OKH+10], and optimal economic allocation of the resource [MBY14, NLRY14].  
 
Groundwater depletion in various regions of the world, including that taking place in the 
Maule river basin (Chile) [BBM+07], Jaguaribe basin (Brazil) [OKH12, OKH+10], Zamora 
aquifer (Mexico) [LPE13], and Andhra Pradesh (India) [ASS12] have been performed using 
various agent based models. However, to the best of the candidate’s knowledge, no such 
detailed models have so far been applied to the Ogallala aquifer. 
 
A significant amount of research has been directed at exploring various methods to escape 
the tragedy of the commons. They have consistently revealed that cooperative groundwater 
extraction is instrumental in addressing sustainability [NWV07, Mad10, MD11, MKA12, 
CPME12, Hai14]. Unfortunately, methods that directly induce groundwater users to 
cooperate have largely remained unaddressed. The role of a central planner in coordinating 
groundwater use among agents has also been explored [SGB11, MBY+14]. Other studies 
reported in the recent literature on sustainable groundwater depletion include promoting 
environmental literacy among its users [LPE13], attaining sustainable consumptive 
practices through regulatory institutions [MD11, ASS+12], as well as penalizing overuse 
through payment schemes [Dol15] or taxation [RW13]. 
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 1.3 Research Contribution 
The Ogallala aquifer provides a unique opportunity to study the behavior among irrigators 
under different scenarios, and the resulting impact on groundwater. Irrigators’ usage 
patterns are driven through entirely economic considerations, with each irrigator trying to 
his or her own overall gain from that activity.  
 
The research described here applies game theory to study the behavior of groundwater 
users (modeled as agents) under different scenarios, and how this collective behavior affects 
groundwater consumption. In contrast to earlier game-theoretic studies on groundwater 
resource use that adopt overly simplistic assumptions to derive game theoretic equilibrium, 
this research makes use of an iterative numerical technique to do so. Applying this 
computationally intensive process allows various real-world complexities to be 
incorporated into the proposed model. The simulations are carried out within a multi-agent 
systems (MAS) framework and over a period of several years, as well as under a variety of 
climatic as well as socio-economic time-varying conditions. 
 
Implementing policies in order to elicit sustainable consumption is receiving much attention 
among policy planners, government and other administrative agencies. A recent example in 
groundwater was adopted by the state of Kansas in 2012, authorizing the formation of Local 
Enhanced Management Areas (LEMAs). A LEMA is a local group of users who enter legally 
enforceable limits on extraction for water rights within a specified geographic boundary. The 
research outlined in this thesis applies groundwater depletion constraints upon individual 
users operating under a LEMA. The results suggest that LEMAs can be very effective in 
eliciting sustainable groundwater use with little impact on the profitability. 
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Chapter 2 - Game Theory & Equilibrium 
 
 2.1 Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
A competitive game consists of 𝑁 agents (or players) who participate in the game. Each agent 
can influence the outcome of the game by selecting a strategy. The strategy of each agent 𝑖 
(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁) is denoted as 𝑥𝑖  and the set of all strategies available to agent 𝑖 as 𝑿𝑖  (so that 
𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑿𝑖).  
 
The joint strategy is the vector of the strategies of all agents and is denoted as 𝐱, so that 𝐱 =
(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑁). Furthermore, as is commonly used in game theoretic notation, the collective 
strategies of all other agents excluding agent 𝑖  is denoted as 𝐱−𝑖 . In other words 𝐱−𝑖 =
(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑖−1, 𝑥𝑖+1… , 𝑥𝑁) and the joint strategy can be denoted as 𝐱 = (𝑥𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖). 
 
The net gain of an agent from participating in the game is called its utility. The utility 𝑈𝑖 of 
any agent 𝑖 is a function that is determined not only by the strategy that that agent takes, but 
also by the strategies selected by all other agents in the game. Therefore 𝑈𝑖: 𝑿1 × 𝑿2 ×
…𝑿𝑁 → ℛ   (𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁). It is convenient to express utilities explicitly as functions of the 
strategies, either as 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖) or as 𝑈𝑖(𝐱). 
 
 2.2 Nash Equilibrium 
In a non-cooperative game, agents are assumed to be selfish as each agent tries to maximize 
its own utility from the game, while disregarding the utilities of all other agents. Under this 
situation, with the strategies of the other agents 𝐱−𝑖 held constant, the agent 𝑖 will select a 
best response strategy 𝑥𝑖  as per the following expression, 
𝑥𝑖 = argmax
𝑦𝑖∈𝑿𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖).                                                                          (2.1)  
Agents can change their strategies in any arbitrary order, in accordance with Eqn. (2.1). Nash 
equilibrium arises when no agent can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its 
previous its strategy. Thus a joint strategy 𝐱∗ = (𝑥1
∗, … , 𝑥𝑁
∗ ) = (𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝐱−𝑖
∗ ) is Nash equilibrium if 
for each agent 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁 the following conditions hold, 
𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖
∗ ) ≤ 𝑈𝑖(𝐱
∗).                                                                          (2.2) 
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Looking at it another way, if 𝐱∗ is at Nash equilibrium, then the best response of each agent 𝑖 
is the agent’s own Nash equilibrium strategy 𝑥𝑖
∗ itself, 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = argmax
𝑦𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖
∗ )                                                                         (2.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example-2.1  A bimatrix game is shown as a table in Fig. 2.1. As only two agents 
are involved, 𝑁 = 2 . The strategy sets are, 𝑿1 = {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷} , and 𝑿2 =
{𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑅, 𝑆, 𝑇}. 
 
These utilities 𝑈1  and 𝑈2  are shown as entries in the table. For example, 
𝑈1(𝐵, 𝑃) = 1,   𝑈2(𝐵, 𝑃) = 2, 𝑈1(𝐵, 𝑄) = 7, 𝑈2(𝐵, 𝑄) = 8,   𝑈1(𝐷, 𝑇) = 6.  In Fig. 
2.1, the utilities and strategies of the row (column) agent are colored in blue (red).  
 
The best joint response is (𝐵, 𝑄) with 𝑈1(𝐵, 𝑄) = 7, 𝑈2(𝐵, 𝑄) = 8. Unfortunately, 
as 𝑈1(𝐵, 𝑃) = 8 > 𝑈1(𝐵, 𝑄), agent 1 will unilaterally change its strategy to 𝐷 in 
accordance with Eqn. 2.1. In a similar manner, as 𝑈2(𝐵, 𝑆) = 9 > 𝑈2(𝐵, 𝑄), agent 
2 will switch to 𝑆. Thus (𝐵, 𝑄) is not an equilibrium strategy.  
 
There are two Nash equilibria in this game, which are (𝐶, 𝑅) and (𝐷, 𝑇) (circled 
in Fig. 2.1) from which neither agent would unilaterally deviate to increase its 
utility. 
 
 
1,1 1,1 2,5
1,2 7,8 1,8
0,4 1,1 4,5
1,1 0,8
5,9 3,0
0,0 4,1
3,3 8,2 3,1 8,0 6,4D
C
B
A
P Q R S T
Figure 2.1. A simple bimatrix game with two agents. 
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 2.3 Nikaido-Isoda Relaxation 
Consider the two joint strategies 𝐱 = (𝑥1 , 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑁) and 𝐲 = (𝑦1 , 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑁). From 𝐱 if any 
agent 𝑖 were to unilaterally change its strategy from 𝑥𝑖  to 𝑦𝑖, the new joint strategy would be 
(𝑥1, … , 𝑦𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑁). This is denoted as 𝑦𝑖|𝐱 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑦𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑁) The increment in its utility due 
to the change in strategy would be 𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑖|𝐱) − 𝑈𝑖(𝐱). The Nikaido-Isoda function is defined as 
[CK24], 
𝜓(𝐱, 𝐲) =∑(𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑖|𝐱) − 𝑈𝑖(𝐱))
𝑁
𝑖=1
.                                                                           (2.4) 
 
Example-2.2  Consider the asymmetric bimatrix game shown in Fig 2.1.  
Let, 𝐱 = (𝐷, 𝑄), 𝐲 = (𝐵, 𝑆). Thus, 
𝜓(𝐱, 𝐲) = 𝜓((𝐷, 𝑄), (𝐵, 𝑆)) 
              = {𝑈1(𝐵|(𝐷, 𝑄)) − 𝑈1(𝐷, 𝑄)} + {𝑈2(𝑆|(𝐷, 𝑄)) − 𝑈2(𝐷, 𝑄)}  
              = {𝑈1(𝐵, 𝑄) − 𝑈1(𝐷, 𝑄)} + {𝑈2(𝐷, 𝑆) − 𝑈2(𝐷, 𝑄)} 
              = {7 − 8} + {0 − 2} = −3. 
 
It is important to note that the payoffs 𝑈1(𝐲) = 𝑈1(𝐵, 𝑆) and 𝑈2(𝐲) = 𝑈2(𝐵, 𝑆) 
are not used in computing 𝜓(𝐱, 𝐲). 
 
From any joint strategy 𝐱 suppose each agent 𝑖 switches strategy to its best response, i.e. 
from 𝑥𝑖  to 𝑦𝑖 , where, 𝑦𝑖 = argmax
𝑦𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑥1, … , 𝑦𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑁).  Let us combine the separate best 
responses of each agent into a separate joint strategy 𝐲 = (𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑖, … , 𝑦𝑁). As each agent 
picks its best response to maximize its own utility, the Nikaido-Isoda function, 𝜓(𝐱, 𝐲) is 
maximized. We define the optimum response function as the joint strategy that maximizes 
the Nikaido-Isoda function [CK24], 
𝑧(𝐱) = argmax
𝐲
𝜓(𝐱, 𝐲).                                                                                                            (2.5) 
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Example-2.3  Consider the asymmetric bimatrix game shown in Fig 2.2.  
Let 𝐱 = (𝑌,𝑀).  The payoffs are, 
𝑈1(𝑌,𝑀) = 3,   𝑈2(𝑌,𝑀) = 1.  
 
The best response of player 1 is, 
argmax
𝑦1
𝑈1(𝑦1, 𝑀) = 𝑈 or 𝑉. 
 
This is because 𝑈1(𝑈,𝑀) = 𝑈1(𝑉,𝑀) = 8. Thus there are two best responses. We 
will consider only 𝑈 (arbitrarily). 
 
Similarly, the best response of player 2 is, 
argmax
𝑦2
𝑈2(𝑌, 𝑦2) = 𝑁. 
This is because 𝑈1(𝑌, 𝑁) = 8. 
 
The optimum response function at 𝐱 = (𝑌,𝑀) is, 
𝑧(𝐱) = 𝑍((𝑌,𝑀)) = (𝑈, 𝑁).   (or (𝑉, 𝑁)) 
 
It can be seen that the Nikaido-Isoda function is, 
𝜓((𝑌,𝑀), (𝑈,𝑁)) = (8 − 3) + (8 − 1) = 13. 
 
For any Nash equilibrium 𝐱∗ (under certain conditions), the following must hold [CK04], 
𝐱∗ = 𝑧(𝐱∗).                                                                                                                              (2.6) 
The relaxation algorithm is shown below. 
1,4 2,1 2,5
1,2 7,8 1,8
0,4 1,1 4,5
3,1 0,8
5,9 3,0
0,2 4,1
3,2 8,2 3,1 8,0 5,3
J K L M N
1,1 1,1 2,3 1,2 1,8
3,3 8,2 3,1 8,0 6,4
V
W
X
Y
Z
U
Figure 2.2. Bimatrix game in example 2.3. 
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Algorithm-2.1 
 Initialize 𝐱(1) 
 For 𝑙 = 1 ∶  ∞ 
Obtain 𝑧(𝐱(𝑙)) by 1-dim optimization for all agents  
    𝐱(𝑙+1) = (1 − 𝜂)𝐱(𝑙) + 𝜂𝑧(𝐱(𝑙)) 
 End 
 
Here 𝜂 ∈ (0,1) is a small constant. At the beginning of an iteration 𝑙 of the above relaxation 
algorithm, a new optimum response 𝑍(𝐱(𝑙)) of the joint strategy 𝐱(𝑙) is determined. Next, the 
strategy 𝐱(𝑙) is incremented to bring it a little closer to 𝑧(𝐱(𝑙)). The updated strategy 𝐱(𝑙+1) is 
treated in an identical manner in the next iteration 𝑙 + 1.  
 
Under certain conditions, the above relaxation algorithm will converge to a Nash 
equilibrium 𝐱∗, 
𝐱∗ = lim
𝑙→∞
𝐱(𝑙) .                                                                                                                       (2.7) 
In practice, the relaxation process is carried out over a finite iterations 𝐿max, which while 
typically being small due to relatively rapid convergence of the relaxation algorithm, must 
be large enough so that only  and the output 𝐱(𝐿) is significantly close to 𝐱∗, i.e. 
‖𝐱(𝐿max) − 𝐱∗‖ ≪ 1. 
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Chapter 3 - Analytical Model of Groundwater Use 
 3.1 Groundwater 
Groundwater, the common pool resource being modeled forms the backbone of this research. 
There are several factors affecting the groundwater head at any location. Groundwater is 
constantly supplied by local precipitation, which is the source of almost all freshwater in the 
hydrologic cycle [WHF98]. Precipitation includes rainfall as well as snow, although rainfall 
is the dominant source of local precipitation in the region considered in this study. Some of 
the locally available water is returned back into the hydrologic cycle by means of evaporation 
[LW60]. With 𝑃 denoting the precipitation per unit area, and 𝐸, the evaporation per unit area, 
our model combines both factors into a single quantity 𝑅, the net replenishment per unit 
area as shown below, 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑡) − 𝐸(𝑡).                                                                                                                (3.1) 
Note that here and in the all other quantities involved in this investigation, the argument 𝑡 
within parenthesis indicates the time step. 
 
Groundwater is also subject to constant flow across locations. In the current framework, we 
have considered a total of 𝑁 agents, indexed as 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑁, that are involved in irrigation. 
Suppose 𝐺𝑖 and 𝐺𝑗  are the groundwater heads (in units of height) at the locations of agents 𝑖 
and 𝑗, then the net groundwater flow from 𝑖 to 𝑗 is 𝑎𝑖,𝑗(𝐺𝑗 − 𝐺𝑖). The quantity 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 is a physical 
constant corresponding to the rate of flow between the two locations. This quantity depends 
on the geology of the immediate region between the two locations, such as soil permeability, 
presence of rocks, etc. as well as elevations and area.  
 
Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any human activity, the groundwater head 
at agent 𝑖’s location can be updated as, 
𝐺𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐺𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑅(𝑡) −∑𝑎𝑖,𝑗 (𝐺𝑗(𝑡) − 𝐺𝑖(𝑡))
𝑁
𝑗=0
.                                                      (3.2) 
The summation term on the right in Eqn. (3.2) aggregates the groundwater flowing outwards 
from the location of agent 𝑖. Note that the summation is carried out over all 𝑁 agents but 
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Figure 3.1. Schematic showing all the factors involved in groundwater variation considered 
in Eqn. (3.3). 
includes a quantity 𝐺0 that represents the groundwater head in the surrounding region. Eqn. 
(3.2) is a straightforward implementation of the well-known Darcy’s law [Dar56]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The addition of human activity to this model introduces another dimension affecting 
groundwater heads. This activity, carried out by the 𝑁 agents in the MAS framework in the 
form of irrigation, is a source of groundwater depletion and is also included in this model 
(see Fig. 3.1). With 𝐷𝑖  being the local groundwater depleted by an agent 𝑖 per unit area, the 
groundwater updating is now, 
𝐺𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐺𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑅(𝑡) − 𝐷𝑖(𝑡) −∑𝑎𝑖,𝑗 (𝐺𝑗(𝑡) − 𝐺𝑖(𝑡))
𝑁
𝑗=0
.                                      (3.3) 
The surrounding groundwater is lowered linearly in terms of the time to model the steady 
drop in groundwater levels that is typically observed, 
𝐺0(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐺0(𝑡) − 𝛾.                                                                                                            (3.4) 
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Here, 𝛾  is the rate at which the average groundwater head is observed to drop in the 
geographic region under consideration. 
 
 3.2 Irrigation 
In this model, each irrigator agent 𝑖 is assigned a fixed land area for irrigation. The agent can 
use this land to cultivate crops (indexed 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾). Irrigation causes local groundwater to 
be depleted in two different ways. It is extracted directly by each irrigator agent through 
pumping in order to water the crop. Additionally, groundwater is also dissipated into the 
atmosphere through transpiration, the process of water continuously evaporating from the 
surface of leaf and released into the hydrologic cycle [LW60]. Both factors are dependent on 
the types of crop irrigated. Thus, the water depletion term in Eqn. 3.3 during a time period 𝑡 
is given by, 
𝐷𝑖(𝑡) =∑(𝑇𝑅𝑘(𝑡) + 𝐼𝑅𝑘(𝑡))𝑥𝑘,𝑖(𝑡)
𝑘
                                                                                 (3.5) 
The quantities 𝑇𝑅𝑘 and 𝐼𝑅𝑘 pertain to the change in groundwater height from transpiration 
and due to groundwater being extracted for irrigation for crop 𝑘. The quantity 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 in Eqn. 
(3.5) above is the fraction of the total land area that is used by agent 𝑖 to irrigate crop 𝑘. Note 
that 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 must lie within the interval [0, 1], so that  0 ≤ 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 ≤ 1. Other constraints placed on 
the variable 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 are discussed later on in this thesis.  
 
With 𝐴𝑖  being the total land area available for irrigation to agent 𝑖  the quantity of crop 𝑘 
harvested at the end of the crop’s farming season is given by, 
𝑄𝑘,𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑖𝑦𝑘(𝑡)𝑥𝑘,𝑖(𝑡).                                                                                  (3.6) 
The factor 𝑦𝑘  in the above product is the yield of crop 𝑘 per unit area. It depends on the 
environmental conditions during the entire irrigation period of that crop, from planting until 
the end of harvesting. 
 
The gross revenue 𝑈𝑖
𝑅 in monetary units that is obtained by the irrigator agent 𝑖 from crop 
sales is the sum of the revenue gained from the sale of each crop and given by the following 
expression, 
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groundwater head
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Figure 3.2. Schematic showing the pathways leading to further groundwater depletion due to irrigation. 
𝑈𝑖
𝑅(𝑡) =∑𝑝𝑘(𝑡)𝑄𝑘,𝑖(𝑡)
𝑘
.                                                                                  (3.7) 
In Eqn. (3.7), the quantity 𝑝𝑘 is the market price per bushel of the crop 𝑘. 
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 3.3 Investment 
The irrigation of crops requires a certain amount of monetary investment arising due to 
groundwater extraction, as well as production costs.  It is assumed that groundwater is 
extracted by means of gas operated pumps. The Nebraska Pumping Plant Performance 
Criteria provides a simple formula to calculate the corresponding pumping cost per unit area 
[RA99, DP12]. This expression is as follows,  
𝐸𝑃𝑖(𝑡) =
𝜃
𝑝
𝑔(𝑡)(𝐺0 − 𝐺𝑖(𝑡) + 2.31𝜓).                                                                               (3.8) 
In the above equation, the constant 𝜃  is the amount of natural gas required to lift a unit 
volume of water per unit height difference, 𝑝 is the pumping efficiency, 𝑔(𝑡) is the price per 
unit of natural gas and 𝜓 is the gauge pressure of the irrigation system which is multiplied 
by an appropriate conversion factor of 2.31.  
 
The total cost of extracting groundwater by agent 𝑖 is given by, 
𝑈𝑖
𝐸(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑖(𝑡)∑𝐼𝑅𝑘(𝑡)𝑥𝑘,𝑖(𝑡)
𝑘
.                                                                                                  (3.9) 
  
The cost associated with the production of per unit area of crop 𝑘 is 𝑐𝑘 . Since the crop is 
irrigated in a fraction of the total area, the area under irrigation of crop 𝑘 is 𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑘,𝑖 and the 
associated production cost is 𝑐𝑘(𝑡)𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑘,𝑖(𝑡). The total production cost associated with all 
crops is the sum of the production costs of all crops and is given by,  
𝑈𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) =∑𝑐𝑘(𝑡)𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑘,𝑖(𝑡)
𝑘
.                                                                                                                (3.10) 
 
 3.4 Game Theoretic Model 
In the game theoretic model, a total of 𝐾 crops are considered. Each agent 𝑖 is involved in 
irrigating a fraction 𝑥𝑘,𝑖(𝑡) of each crop 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾  during a time interval 𝑡  in years. The 
simulation is carried out in discrete time steps until 𝑇max , so that 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇max . The 
strategy 𝐱𝑖 of each agent 𝑖 is a 𝐾 × 𝑇max vector consists of the fraction of its available area 
used to irrigate each crop, and during each time interval.  
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Two assumptions have been made for the sake of simplicity: (i) fully informed agents, and (ii) 
utility time-invariance. The first assumption implies that the agents can simultaneously 
access all environmental and economic future forecasts during all 𝑇max  time steps while 
optimizing their strategies. This assumption is made here in order to study the model 
without introducing irrelevant complexities arising from data uncertainties. When there is a 
significant amount of uncertainty (as in climate change), simulations have been carried out 
over multiple scenarios. 
 
Under the second assumption of utility time invariance, the agents place equal weights to 
their net monetary gain for each time step 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇max . The rationale behind this 
simplification arises from several preliminary simulations that fortuitously showed that 
there the resultant changes in the agent’s strategies when future utilities were progressively 
discounted by 2% - 5% each year were not large enough to change the conclusions drawn 
from this entire study. Discounts higher than that are rendered meaningless when 𝑇max is 
kept at large values since discounted utilities well into the future are lower than floating 
point representation bounds. 
 
This net gain of an agent 𝑖 at time 𝑡 can be computed readily as the difference between the 
revenue 𝑈𝑖
𝑅(𝑡)  obtained from Eqn. (3.7) and the costs 𝑈𝑖
𝐸(𝑡)  and 𝑈𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)  which are 
determined using Eqns. (3.9) and (3.10). The overall utility that the agent maximizes is the 
aggregate of all such gains and is given by, 
𝑈𝑖(𝐱𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖|𝛀) = ∑ 𝑈𝑖
𝑅(𝑡) − (𝑈𝑖
𝐸(𝑡) + 𝑈𝑖
𝑃(𝑡))
𝑇max
𝑡=1
.                                                                          (3.11) 
All input data to the model are included in 𝛀 in Eqn. (3.11). 
 
The Nash equilibrium strategies analogous to Eqn. (2.3) and the corresponding utilities are, 
𝐱𝑖
∗ = argmax
𝐱𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝐱𝑖 , 𝐱−𝑖
∗ |𝛀),                                                                                                  (3.12) 
𝑈𝑖
∗ = max
𝐱𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝐱𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖
∗ |𝛀) = 𝑈𝑖(𝐱𝑖
∗, 𝐱−𝑖
∗ |𝛀).                                                                          (3.13) 
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Note that each opponent joint strategy 𝐱−𝑖  contains (𝑁 − 1) × 𝐾 × 𝑇max  entries as it 
accounts for all remaining  𝑁 − 1 agents other than 𝑖, and the joint strategy of all agents 𝐱 
includes a total of 𝑁 × 𝐾 × 𝑇max real numbered entries. Fortunately, mathematical software 
packages (such as MATLAB used in this research) support multidimensional arrays.  
 
With 𝐱 ≜ (𝐱𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖) and 𝐲 ≜ (𝐲𝑖, 𝐲−𝑖) being any pair of strategies, the Nikaido-Isoda function 
is given by, 
𝜓(𝐱, 𝐲) =∑(𝑈𝑖(𝐲𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖|𝛀) − 𝑈𝑖(𝐱𝑖, 𝐱−𝑖|𝛀))
𝑖
.                                                                 (3.14) 
The Nikaido-Isoda relaxation procedure specific to this model is shown below. 
 
Algorithm-3.1 
 Initialize 𝐱 
while (‖𝑧(𝐱) − 𝐱‖∞ ≥ 𝜖) do 
𝑧(𝐱) = argmax
𝐲,c(𝐲)=𝑇
𝜓(𝐱, 𝐲) 
𝐱 = (1 − 𝜂)𝐱 + 𝜂𝑧(𝐱) 
end 
 
It should be noted that the Nash equilibrium is not unique in our model; initializing the 
relaxation algorithm with different values through different seeds the MATLAB random 
number generator produced different strategies under equilibrium. Similar observations 
have been reported elsewhere [Mad10]. Fortunately, there were no discernible differences 
in the agents’ utilities across each simulation. All results provided throughout the remainder 
of this thesis have been obtained by simulating the Multi-Agent System (see Chapter 4) with 
the same random number seed value. 
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Figure 4.1. Map of Kansas showing the extent of the Ogallala aquifer region (blue) and Garden 
city (red star). 
Chapter 4 - Multi-Agent System 
 4.1 Geographical Setting 
The rate of groundwater decline has been estimated to be approximately one foot every year 
[USG14]. This rate of decline has been assumed in all simulation results reported in this 
thesis. 
 
The study has been carried out with a set of five hypothetical irrigators located in Garden 
city in southwest Kansas. Garden city is located at 37°58′31″N 100°51′51″W as 
shown in Fig. 4.1 and its average elevation is 2,838 feet. The immediate neighborhood 
around this city is predominantly agricultural, with the adjoining Ogallala aquifer being the 
source of water needed for irrigation. Garden city is projected to face severe water shortage 
in future [Lit09].  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
5
3
4
1
2
Figure 4.2. Groundwater flow between the agents’ locations. Box sizes reflect actual 
areas available to agents 1– 5. 
 4.2 Irrigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Area and initial groundwater heads of each agent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agent index  𝑖 
Area in acres 
 𝐴𝑖  
Initial ground-water head 
in meters 
 𝐺𝑖(0) 
1 1200 125.0 
2 1200 113.0 
3 1000 125.0 
4 1000 113.0 
5 900 118.0 
0 (Aquifer) - 118.8 
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Figure 4.3. Inputs and outputs of DSSAT; the outputs serve as input data during the MAS 
simulation. 
Three crops have been considered in this research (𝐾 = 3), which are corn (𝑘 = 1), sorghum 
(𝑘 = 2), and wheat (𝑘 = 3). The study involves five irrigator agents (𝑁 = 5). Table 4.1 shows 
the area associated with each irrigator agent and their initial groundwater heads. Fig. 4.2 
shows the permeability coefficients of the groundwater flow between the agents. The annual 
rate of drop of the aquifer’s groundwater head (see Eqn. (3.4)) is kept at 𝛾 = 304.8 mm/year. 
This value is the average drop rate within the period [USGS14]. 
 
As corn and sorghum are summer crops and wheat is a winter crop, agent strategies are 
constrained in the following manner,   
0 ≤  𝑥1,𝑖, 𝑥2,𝑖, 𝑥3,𝑖 ≤ 1,   
                                        𝑥1,𝑖 + 𝑥2,𝑖 = 1.                                                                                                    (4.1) 
 
 
 4.3 Physical Data Preparation 
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Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT), a widely used software 
package with an underlying crop simulation model, has been used to generate crop related 
data for this research [D15]. The raw inputs to DSSAT consists of (i) weather data (𝐖), (ii) 
crop data (𝐂𝑘), and (iii) soil data (𝐒). The package’s outputs, for each crop 𝑘 each year, that 
are used here are the following: (i) the transpiration, 𝑇𝑅𝑘 , (ii) the water extracted for 
irrigation, 𝐼𝑅𝑘 , (iii) the evapotranspiration 𝐸𝑇𝑘 , (iv) the precipitation, 𝑃𝑘 , and (v) the crop 
yield per unit area, 𝑦𝑘. Note that 𝐸𝑇𝑘 and 𝑃𝑘 pertain to evapotranspiration and precipitation 
only during the relevant season that the crop is grown.  The inputs and outputs of DSSAT are 
shown in Fig. 4.3. 
 
Historical weather data between years 1964 – 2014 used as the raw inputs 𝐖 to DSSAT are 
available by National Center for Environmental Information [NCD15]. This data consists of 
daily records of the precipitation, solar radiation, and the minimum and maximum 
temperatures. Aggregated over the entire year the precipitation data is used to obtain 𝑃 in 
Eqn. (3.1).  
 
Data pertaining to Garden city, for each crop 𝑘 used in this study, which is available online at 
Kansas State University [CPT15] is used as the other input 𝐂𝑘 to DSSAT. Finally, the soil data 
𝐒 was obtained from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) [USDA15]. 
 
The evapotranspiration 𝐸𝑇𝑘 obtained from DSSAT includes the transpiration 𝑇𝑅𝑘 as well as 
the evaporation taking place during the growing season of each crop 𝑘. Hence the difference 
𝐸𝑇𝑘 − 𝑇𝑅𝑘 is the total evaporation during this season and independent of 𝑘. In this study, the 
average difference is taken as the evaporation that takes place within that season. In order 
to estimate the total water evaporation per unit area for the entire year 𝑡 , it has been 
assumed for simplicity that the ratio of the precipitation during the growing season and that 
over the entire year is equal to the same ratio of  the evaporation. In other words, 
1
𝑃(𝑡)
∑𝑃𝑘
𝑘
=  
1
𝐸(𝑡)
∑(𝐸𝑇𝑘 − 𝑇𝑅𝑘)
𝑘
.                                                                (4.2) 
Eqn. (4.2) is used in this study to estimate the evaporation 𝐸 in Eqn. (3.1).  
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The outputs 𝑇𝑅𝑘 and 𝐼𝑅𝑘 from DSSAT summed across an entire year are used in Eqn. (3.5) 
and Eqn. (3.9). The output 𝑦𝑘 is used in Eqn. (3.6). 
 
Unfortunately the historical input data to DSSAT, contains a great deal of variation across 
time that do not represent any long-term trends in the time series. These variations 
manifested themselves as ‘noise’ in the raw output data produced by DSSDAT. Initial 
experiments revealed that this noise level was large enough to subsume the differences 
across the different scenarios in some of our simulations. The approach taken was to express 
the outputs of DSSAT as a quadratic approximation ?̂?DSSAT()  of its inputs that can be 
expressed succinctly in the following manner, 
(
 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑘(𝑡)
𝐼𝑅𝑘(𝑡)
𝐸𝑇𝑘(𝑡)
𝑃𝑘(𝑡)
𝑦𝑘(𝑡) )
 
 
= ?̂?DSSAT(𝐖(𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇max), 𝐂𝑘(𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇max)).                                      (4.3) 
Note that the set of arguments of the approximating function ?̂?DSSAT() does not include the 
soil data 𝐒  as one of its arguments. This is because in all our simulations this is a fixed 
quantity that does not vary with time and is implicitly incorporated within the coefficients 
of the quadratic function.  
 
 4.4 Socio-Economic Parameters 
The raw market price 𝑝𝑘  of each crop 𝑘  was obtained from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service [NAS15]. The raw prices were subject to exponential saturations to obtain 
the actual values used to compute the agent utilities in Eqn. (3.7). Accordingly, the market 
price 𝑝𝑘 of each crop 𝑘 is given by, 
𝑝𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑘
∞(𝑡) + (𝑝𝑘
0(𝑡) − 𝑝𝑘
∞(𝑡)) 𝑒
−∑𝑄𝑘,𝑖(𝑡)
?̃?𝑘 .                                                                  (4.4) 
In Eqn. (4.4), the saturated market price 𝑝𝑘 is bounded within the interval (𝑝𝑘
∞ 𝑝𝑘
0) and ?̃?𝑘 is 
an appropriate scale constant. The summation term appearing in the exponent term’s 
numerator is used to determine the total crop market supply. This treatment of the market 
prices is useful to imitate the limited market of wheat. 
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The production cost 𝑐𝑘  for each crop was obtained from USDA [AERS15]. The cost of 
production 𝑐𝑘  of each crop 𝑘is also subject to exponential saturation within the intervals 
(𝑐𝑘
∞ 𝑐𝑘
0). 
𝑐𝑘,𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑐𝑘
∞(𝑡) + (𝑐𝑘
0(𝑡) − 𝑐𝑘
∞(𝑡)) 𝑒
−𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑘,𝑖(𝑡)
?̃?𝑘 .                                                                   (4.5) 
It can be seen that the quantity of the crop is not summed across all agents in Eqn. (4.5). 
 
Owing to extraneous factors not considered in this research, all raw prices and costs 
contained significant variations. In order to capture only the long term variations, the raw 
data had to be replaced with trends, 
(𝑝𝑘
∞(𝑡), 𝑝𝑘
0(𝑡)) = (𝑝𝑘
∞(0), 𝑝𝑘
0(0)) 𝑒
𝑡
𝜏𝑘 .                                                                                (4.6) 
Here the quantity 𝜏𝑘 is a time constant that minimizes the sum squared deviation from the 
observed data. In a similar manner, with 𝜃𝑘  being the analogous time constant, the costs 
were obtained as, 
(𝑐(𝑡), 𝑐𝑘
0(𝑡)) = (𝑐𝑘
∞(0), 𝑐𝑘
0(0)) 𝑒
𝑡
𝜃𝑘 .                                                                                    (4.7) 
The source of raw gas price data 𝑔  was obtained from the U.S Energy Information 
Administration website [NGP15]. Upon exponential fitting, the gas price used in this study is, 
𝑔(𝑡) = 𝑔(0)𝑒
𝑡
𝜁.                                                                                                                        (4.8) 
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 4.5 Simulation 
The purpose of the MAS simulation is to determine the utilities 𝑈𝑖(𝐱|𝛀) of each irrigator 𝑖 
(Eqn. (3.11)). It serves as a procedure invoked by Algorithm 3.1. As each utility represents 
the aggregate over time, the MAS simulation, depicted below (Algorithm 4.1) is carried out 
sequentially from 𝑡 = 1 until 𝑇max.  
 
 
Algorithm-4.1 
 Input 𝐱  
For each agent 𝑖 𝑈𝑖 = 0 
𝑡 = 1 
While 𝑡 ≤  𝑇max 
 Update 𝐺𝑖(𝑡 + 1) of each agent 𝑖 
 Obtain DSSAT data 𝑇𝑅𝑘(𝑡), 𝐼𝑅𝑘(𝑡), 𝐸𝑇𝑘(𝑡), 𝑦𝑘(𝑡)  
 Compute 𝑈𝑖
𝑅(𝑡), 𝑈𝑖
𝐸(𝑡), 𝑈𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) of each agent 𝑖 
 For each agent 𝑖 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖
𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑈𝑖
𝐸(𝑡) + 𝑈𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) 
𝑡 = 𝑡 + 1 
End 
Output 𝑈𝑖 of each agent 𝑖 
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Figure 5.1. Strategies vs. year for each agent (baseline). 
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Chapter 5 - Results: Baseline Model 
 
 5.1 Setup 
The first study of the proposed MAS is to explore how projected changes in future weather 
may produce shifts in local irrigation practices, and how this shift affects groundwater level. 
The next study of the proposed MAS is to explore how changes in social and economic 
parameters in the future will affect groundwater use. In order to perform comparative 
analyses, a baseline simulation is performed where all these parameters remain at constant 
values obtained from historical data. The prices of corn, wheat and sorghum are maintained 
at a constant level equal to the average prices during the ten-year period 2001 – 2010. 
Although the gas price shows an increasing trend during this period, it is also fixed at the 
average value. The simulation is carried out over a period of 20 years. All the inputs to the 
MAS are obtained using Eqn. (4.3) using the historical weather data 𝐖 during the 20 year 
period 1995 – 2014. 
 
 5.2 Results 
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Fig. 5.1 shows the strategies of the five irrigator agents evolving during the 20 year period 
under the baseline scenario. All agents used the entire land area for cultivation during 
summer, opting to grow either corn or sorghum. Although corn has a larger market than 
sorghum resulting in higher revenues, it also requires more water for irrigation. The tradeoff 
between the higher revenues (𝑈𝑖
𝑅) and lower extraction costs (𝑈𝑖
𝐸) is clearly seen in this 
figure. The agents switch regularly between the two crops, opting for higher revenues in 
some years and conserving water by growing sorghum during other years. It can be observed 
that the most common strategy is to switch between the two summer crops in alternate years, 
although choosing to grow the same crop for two (or even three) years is also seen. It can be 
seen that the initial groundwater head (𝐺𝑖(0)) available with each agent influences its 
irrigation strategy. Although agents 1 and 2 have equal irrigation areas, as agent 1 has a 
higher it grows corn for 12 of the entire 20 yearly periods, while agent 2 grows corn for only 
11 of those years. In a similar manner, although agents 3 and 4 have identical areas, they 
grow corn for 11 years and 7 years. Agent 5 which has an intermediate value of initial 
groundwater chooses to grow corn for 10 of the 20 years. 
 
Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 show how the utilities and the utilities per unit area vary with time during 
this twenty-year period.  In Fig. 5.2 it can be seen that, as expected, the utilities of agents 1 
and 2, which have the largest areas under irrigation, are the highest, while that of agent 5 
with the smallest area, is the lowest. When the utilities per unit area are compared, a similar 
pattern is observed, although the differences are not as discernible. Agents 1 and 2 have the 
highest utilities per unit area while agent 5 has the lowest. We hypothesize that this 
phenomenon reflects the economics of scale – irrigators with larger areas under cultivation 
are able to garner higher benefits from each unit of land. 
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Figure 5.2. Utilities vs. year for each agent (baseline). 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
3100
3200
3300
3400
3500
3600
3700
3800
3900
4000
t (year) 
U
i 
/ 
A
i 
(d
o
lla
r/
a
c
re
) 

utilities per unit area (U
i
 / A
i
) vs. time (t) for each agent
 
 
Agent1
Agent2
Agent3
Agent4
Agent5
Figure 5.3. Utilities per unit area vs. year for each agent (baseline). 
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Figure 5.4. Groundwater head vs. year for each agent (baseline). 
 
 
The groundwater head at each agent’s location as well as that of the surrounding aquifer is 
shown as a function of time in Fig. 5.4. It can be observed that constant irrigation throughout 
the entire simulation period for maximum utility clearly results in a larger decline in the 
groundwater in comparison to the groundwater head of the aquifer. It can also be seen that 
agents 1 and 3, which have higher initial groundwater levels show the steepest declines in 
their groundwater heads over time. In comparison, agents 2 and 4 show the least decline in 
comparison to the other agents. This observation can be explained by examining the amount 
of corn – the most water intensive, yet profitable crop, grown by each agent. Agents 1 and 3, 
have the highest groundwater heads at the beginning of the simulation, grow corn for a total 
of 23 years (see Fig. 5.1), averaging 11.5 years per agent. Agent 5, which begins with an 
intermediate water head, grows corn a total of 10 time periods, while agents 2 and 4 grow 
the crop for an average of only 9 years per agent. This pattern is consistent with earlier 
studies that report that higher groundwater availability leads the irrigators to exploit the 
resource rather than conserving it. 
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Figure 5.5. the total volume of water pumped each year by each agent is plotted 
as a function of the agent’s utility of that year. Upon visual inspection, it is clear 
that the points center around two distinct clusters per agent, depending on the 
summer crop the agent picks for the year. 
In Fig. 5.5, the total volume of water pumped each year by each agent is plotted as a function 
of the agent’s utility of that year. Upon visual inspection, it is clear that the points center 
around two distinct clusters per agent, depending on the summer crop the agent picks for 
the year. 
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Chapter 6 - Results: Future Scenarios 
 6.1 Climate Change Scenarios 
There is near unanimity that the Great Plains region is expected to experience severe climate 
change during the mid 21st century, with large changes in rainfall patterns. One study 
predicts precipitation shifts towards wetter summers in the northern areas of the Great 
Plains by 10% whereas between 10% – 30% drier weather in the southern Great Plains 
[PC13]. Accordingly two possible scenarios are reported here that represent possible 
weather patterns during the period 2032 – 2051. The first scenario models a 20% increase 
in summer precipitation, while the other scenario considers a 10% uniform decrease in 
precipitation throughout the year. The historical precipitation data in 𝐖  is changed 
accordingly to obtain the MAS inputs using Eqn. (4.3). Additionally as increased rainfall is 
associated with cloudier conditions, the summer solar radiance component of 𝐖 is lowered 
by 5% for the first scenario, and uniformly increased by 2% in the other.   
 
Fig. 6.1 shows the irrigation strategies of the agents under higher summer precipitation. Due 
to the increased availability of water, agents 1 and 2 grow corn for 18 of the 20 year 
simulation period. A similar upward trend in number of years used to grow corn is seen in 
the other agents. In Fig. 6.2, which shows the changed irrigation strategies with lower 
precipitation, the opposite trend is seen. Here, all five agents opt to cultivate corn for a 
smaller number of years. 
 
The outcomes of the two future precipitation scenarios on the local groundwater levels are 
provided in Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 5.4. Although the rate at which groundwater drops in lower in 
Fig. 6.3, this change is not as significant as one would expect from a 20% increase in summer 
rainfall. 
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Figure 6.2. Strategies vs. year for each agent (increased rainfall). 
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Figure 6.1. Strategies vs. year for each agent (decreased rainfall). 
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Figure 6.4. Groundwater head vs. year for each agent and aquifer (increased 
rainfall). 
Figure 6.3. Groundwater head vs. year for each agent and aquifer (decreased 
rainfall). 
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Figure 6.5. Number of years a grain is grown under each scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6.2 Socio-Economic Scenarios 
The next study of the proposed MAS is to explore how changes in social and economic 
parameters in the future will affect groundwater use. The parameters that are affected in 
each case are shown in Table 6.1 below.  
 
Table 6.1. Parameter changes under different socio-economic scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.6 shows the strategies of the five agents over time under this scenario. In anticipation 
of higher future crop prices, the agents try to limit water use during the initial periods by 
growing sorghum instead of corn in summer, switching to corn during the later stages. The 
wheat irrigation strategy also follows a similar trend with all five agents not growing any 
wheat during the first seven years, but subjecting the entire available land area to grow it 
Scenario 
Parameters 
𝐺0(𝑡) 𝑝𝑘(𝑡) 𝑔(𝑡) 𝑐𝑘(𝑡) 𝐼𝑅𝑘(𝑡) 
Baseline decrease constant constant constant constant 
Population increase decrease increase constant constant constant 
Water use improvement decrease constant constant constant decrease 
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Figure 6.6. Strategies vs. year for each agent with population growth. 
during the last four years of the 20 year period. This observation is reflected in the utilities 
of the agents as shown in Fig. 6.7, where there is a steady increase in each agent’s utility with 
time. Likewise in Fig. 6.8, the agents limited water use results in smaller declines in their 
groundwater heads during the initial years, with agents 4 and 5 showing marginal increases 
during the years 1 and 2. 
 
The other scenario considers more efficient water use due to technological changes. The 
irrigation water requirement 𝐼𝑅𝑘  for each crop 𝑘 , which is obtained from Eqn. (4.3) is 
subjected to 2% decrease each year. Fig. 6.9 shows the strategies adopted by the agents each 
year. In comparison to Fig. 5.1, there is no marked change in the crops chosen to grow each 
year. Agents 1, 3 and 4 select to grow corn for only one more year in comparison to the 
baseline strategy; while agent 2 grows corn for 13 out of the 20 years in comparison to 11 
years earlier. On the other hand, agent 5 does not show any change in its overall strategy by 
growing more corn. Thus, this model predicts that more efficient use of water for crop 
irrigation does not dramatically alter the irrigation patterns of the agents. The 
corresponding evolution in groundwater heads with time is shown in Fig. 6.10. The reduced 
groundwater requirement results in a somewhat slower decline in groundwater levels. 
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Figure 6.7. Utilities vs. year for each agent with population growth. 
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Figure 6.8. Groundwater head vs. year for each agent with population growth. 
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Figure 6.9. Strategies vs. year for each agent with more efficient groundwater use 
(2% per year). 
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Figure 6.10. Groundwater head vs. year for each agent with more efficient 
groundwater use (2% per year). 
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Chapter 7 - Cooperative Groundwater Use 
 
 7.1 LEMA 
The state of Kansas in 2012 has adopted a policy to enhance groundwater sustainability by 
authorizing the formation of Local Enhanced Management Areas (LEMAs). A LEMA is a local 
group of users who enter legally enforceable limits on extraction for water rights within a 
specified geographic boundary. The LEMA establishes its own limit on the total groundwater 
usage for a period of five years. Each irrigator is allowed to decide how to adjust its own 
irrigation strategy, such that the total groundwater extracted by it during this five-year 
period stays within the allowable limits imposed by the LEMA. 
 
Since all simulations in this research have been performed for twenty years, the entire 
simulation can be divided into four non-overlapping 5-year periods. Let  denote a set of five 
years representing any such 5-year period, say,  = {1,2,3,4,5}. The total volume of water 
pumped by agent 𝑖 at time 𝑡 ∈  without any restrictions is given by, 
𝑊𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑖∑𝐼𝑅𝑘(𝑡)𝑥𝑘,𝑖(𝑡)
𝑘
.                                                                                                  (7.1) 
The agent’s total water pumped during this period  is, 
𝑊𝑖 =∑𝑊𝑖(𝑡)
𝑡∈ 
.                                                                                                                           (7.2) 
The LEMA limits the water consumption to a value 𝐿𝑖  which is a fraction of 𝑊𝑖. For instance 
𝐿𝑖 = 0.9𝑊𝑖, implying that the agent is required to lower its extraction by 10%. 
 
 7.2 Results 
MAS simulations are carried out with 𝐿𝑖 =  0.95𝑊𝑖, 0.90𝑊𝑖, 0.85𝑊𝑖 , 0.80𝑊𝑖, 0.75𝑊𝑖  and 
0.70𝑊𝑖. There are four periods  in these simulations. All five agents are assumed to form the 
LEMA.  
 
The aggregate utilities for different values of 𝐿𝑖  are shown in Fig. 7.1. where the aggregate 
utilities are the totals over the 20-year duration. It is observed in Fig. 7.1 (top) that restricting 
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groundwater depletion up to 𝐿𝑖 = 0.80𝑊𝑖  results in steady increases in the utilities of agents 
3, 4, and 5 which have smaller areas under irrigation, while those of agents 1 and 2 which 
have larger areas under irrigation is fairly consistent without any perceivable trend. When 
𝐿𝑖  is reduced further, this trend is no longer observed. 
 
Remarkably, the combined utility of all five agents, shown in Fig. 7.1 (bottom) also reveals 
an upward trend until 𝐿𝑖 = 0.80𝑊𝑖 . This trend can be explained as follows. When the agents 
with larger areas placed under irrigation limit their water use, due to groundwater flow 
across farms, the water heads at the remaining agents are higher. As a result, their costs of 
extracting groundwater (Eqn. (3.9)) is reduced. 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the changed irrigation strategies at 𝐿𝑖 = 0.80𝑊𝑖 . As a result of the restricted 
groundwater use, the agents irrigate more sorghum instead of corn. Furthermore it is also 
seen that the strategies of agents 4 and 5 which have smaller areas under irrigation are 
shifted more than the others. 
 
These results are encouraging, as they clearly show the effectiveness of LEMAs as a means 
to address the tragedy of the commons. 
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Figure 7.2. Strategies of the agents at 80% limit. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
The MAS model in this research is shown to successfully simulate complex behavioral 
patterns shown in real irrigator agents. The following are the most significant aspects of real 
irrigation that is also seen in the MAS model. 
 The agent strategies at Nash equilibrium incorporates crop rotation which is observed in 
real irrigation, where the agents alternate between the two summer crops, corn and 
sorghum. 
 The MAS model exhibits the well-known phenomenon of economics of scale; agents with 
larger areas under irrigation are able to obtain slightly larger revenues per unit area 
under irrigation. 
 The model is able to simulate various plausible climate-change scenarios. 
 The model is able to simulate various plausible socio-economic scenarios. 
 The model simulates cooperative groundwater use, showing that LEMAs will lead to 
better sustainable practices while increasing the aggregate payoffs of the irrigators. 
 
Future research of this study can be conducted in the following directions. 
 Extending the model to include more crop types. 
 Enhancing the groundwater flow to include more geospatial features. 
 Extending the model to larger sets of agents and incorporate coalition formation 
algorithms. 
 Applying correlated equilibrium to obtain better irrigator payoffs under coordinated 
groundwater use. 
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